Doctors irresponsibly minimising antidepressant withdrawal

Doctors have always minimised the significance of antidepressant discontinuation problems (see eg. previous post). It doesn’t seem to concern them that they have made so many people dependent on antidepressants (see eg. another previous post).

In a systematic review and meta-analysis, Kalfas et el (2025) conclude that the mean number of discontinuation symptoms at week 1 after stopping antidepressants was below the threshold for clinically significant discontinuation syndrome. The article is motivated to show that antidepressant withdrawal may be less common that is thought to be the case (see New Scientist article). The difficulty in obtaining estimates of incidence is made worse by the lack of methodologically rigorous, randomised placebo-controlled trials in real world settings, certainly over the longer-term rather than just after one week. In fact, initially on stopping antidepressants, people can be hopeful that they no longer need antidepressants. 

The data including in the meta-analysis was from 11 trials with short duration of use of antidepressant: 6 for 8 weeks; 4 for 12 weeks; and one for 26 weeks. People can stay on antidepressants for considerable periods of time and the risk of withdrawal symptoms increases with duration of use (see eg. Horowitz et al, 2025). This data obtained after one week discontinuation may well not be generalisable to the bulk of long-term users, particularly if followed up for more than a week.

The Telegraph reports that the research team have suggested guidelines need to be re-written to reassure people that they are unlikely to experience severe side effects when coming off antidepressants, which is clearly unjustified (see eg. article by Mark Horowitz & Joanna Moncrieff on The Conversation). Such advice is contrary to current guidance that people should be informed of the risk of withdrawal symptoms on first starting antidepressants (see eg. previous post). Doctors should be encouraged to follow this guidance, rather than the proposal by Kalfas et al. At least the researchers have subsequently admitted that most studies they reviewed had only followed up patients for two weeks and that antidepressant treatments they studied were shorter than those commonly prescribed in the real world, although this isn’t as explicit in the paper as it should be.

Common mental health conditions have worsened despite Improving Access to Psychological Therapies

Part 1 of the Adult Psychiatric Morbidty Survey (APMS) for 2023/4 has been published (see website). The last time this survey was sampled was in 2014 (see previous post). 

Despite the proportion of 16 to 74 year olds with common mental health condition symptoms reporting receipt of treatment increasing from 24.4% in 2007 to 39.4% in 2014 to 47.7% in 2023/4, the proportion of 16 to 64 year olds identified with a common mental disorder has also increased from 17.6% in 2007 to 18.9% in 2014 to 22.6% in 2023/4. Services are struggling to cope with a vast increase in demand but  mental health need nonetheless apparently continues to increase. The increased service activity, if effective, should be expected to reduce prevalence of mental disorder, not increase it.

Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) was rolled out from 2008 (see eg. previous post). Despite reported rates of improvement over the short-term, longer-term outcome may not be so beneficial (see eg. another previous post). The reality is that hoping for easy answers to mental health problems means that providing increasing resources for services can never meet the perceived need of the population (see eg. previous post). Psychiatry can’t magic away the pain and suffering of being human (see eg. another previous post). It shouldn’t mislead people that a course of medication or a brief psychological therapy will necessarily solve all mental health difficulties. I’m not being nihilistic about psychiatric treatment but the limits to psychiatry do need to be acknowledged. Throwing money at the problem isn’t the whole solution at least.

What counts as psychopathology?

Sami Timimi in his recent book, Searching for normal, describes how the diagnoses of autism and ADHD have changed over the years. They have gone from uncommon conditions to being widespread. As Sami says:-

From rare diagnoses given to kids with significant learning difficulties or active and mischievous boys, autism and ADHD follow an impressive developmental trajectory out of the confines of child guidance clinics and into the belly of mass culture.

When Sami and I trained, mental health problems in children were mainly separated into conduct disorders and emotional disorders. There was little attempt to categorise children’s behaviour and emotions into psychiatric diagnoses, as in adult psychiatry. The focus was on family therapy with attempts made to formulate hypotheses about the functioning of the child in the context of the family and community.

Sami describes how the diagnostic ideology of adult psychiatry has invaded child psychiatry, introducing a “culture of pathologising, labelling and medicating”. As he says, “There has never been a generation of young people so colonised at such a young age by mental health propaganda”. In fact, child psychiatry has been an exporter of diagnoses to adult psychiatry leading to a ballooning of ADHD and autism in adults.  People can identify with these diagnoses, which then seem to provide explanations for their personal difficulties. 

Of course it’s important to try to understand the reasons for personal difficulties. But the reasons can’t be proven as such, which is why it’s tempting to latch onto a psychiatric diagnosis that may seem to provide an external explanation. But such states may be better appreciated as understandable responses to the situation in which the person finds themself. It’s not always easy to maintain a positive sense of self. A psychiatric diagnosis may not necessarily provide a valid explanation for any negative views of oneself and situation, particularly if that diagnosis is supported by unproven speculations about brain pathology. We all need myths to live by and whatever relief a diagnosis may appear to provide, it does need to have sound foundations. We do seem to be inflating the value of pathologising everyday difficulties, certainly in terms of the brain (see eg. previous post). 

Transforming mental health services

Pullman et al (2025) consider how social work could contribute to the transformation in mental health services from a predominately medical approach to a balanced, evidenced-based biopsychosocial approach to care, as recommended by the World Health Organisation (WHO) (see eg, its 2022 World Mental Health Report). Services need to provide person-centred, human rights-based and recovery-orientated care.

As Pullman et al say

Critical Psychiatry stands as a minority movement within contemporary psychiatry, providing a critical analysis of the Medical Model. Its primary focus lies in addressing the inclination of a reductionistic Medical Model to dehumanize care …. In contrast, Critical Psychiatry advocates for a relational, recovery-oriented, and multi-cultural treatment approach, operating within the framework of a comprehensive biopsychosocial paradigm 

Pullman et al conclude by advocating several practical strategies to support the transformation agenda:-

(1) Consistent advocacy for the biopsychosocial model within mental health policy and educational curricula. 

(2) A renewed emphasis on teaching, training and supervising biopsychosocial approaches within professional education. The Biopsychosocial model has a long history but has struggled to gain a consistently prominent position within mental health work often in the face of bio-medical hegemony within psychiatry.

(3) To prioritize the voices and experiences of those with lived experience of mental ill health and mental distress, either directly or as part of families and social groups. Too often, mentally ill people have experienced inadequate treatment and, at times, abuse and oppression. This situation has not improved adequately, despite the inception of modern psychiatric practice.

Stuck on antidepressants

A Sunday Times investigation found that a quarter of women in their fifties and sixties take antidepressants, and 15% of women over 50 have been on them for longer than five years (see article). As the article also says, some people on antidepressants also experience emotional blunting and difficult withdrawal symptoms.

James Davies, who I have mentioned before (see eg. previous post), is quoted as saying, “[T]he evidence base [for antidepressants] suggests they’re no more effective than placebos. But unlike placebos, they have side-effects”. I pointed out to him in a tweet that placebos do have side effects, which are called nocebo effects. 

Antidepressants are inadvertent placebos. They are not usually intentionally prescribed for their placebo effects. Instead doctors tend to believe in antidepressants and that their efficacy has been proven, whereas this is at least open to question (see eg. previous post). Patients have also been encouraged to take them by the myth that the serotonin imbalance theory has also been proven, which is not the case (see eg. another previous post). 

Patients may therefore acquire attachments to their medication more because of what they mean to them than what they do. Many patients often stay on psychotropic medications, maybe several at once, even though their actual benefit is questionable. Any change threatens an equilibrium related to a complex set of meanings that their medications have acquired. No wonder they may have withdrawal symptoms. They have been made dependent on antidepressants and may well be frightened to try to manage without them. It’s easier to stay on antidepressants rather than upset any apparent equilibrium their medications have seemed to create.

Such nocebo effects also apply to emotional blunting. Antidepressants can tend to leave people feeling that there is a sense in which their psychosocial problems, which caused the depression, have not really been solved (see eg. previous post).  However much they may feel that antidepressants may have helped stabilise their mood, they may, therefore, also feel emotionally flat and not back to their real self. 

I am, of course, not saying that antidepressants do not block reuptake of catecholamines, such as serotonin, in the synaptic cleft between neurones. But how much the side effects of withdrawal symptoms and emotional blunting may well be due to nocebo effects remains to be determined.

Universal remedies for mental health problems

I’ve mentioned the problems with mental health services in Greater Manchester before (eg. see previous post). Mental health workers in Manchester have recently called off their strike having obtained more funding for services (see Big Issue article). As I’ve said before (see eg. previous post), the problem isn’t just about more funding. 

The fundamental problem is the management of demand for mental health services. The trouble is that services themselves have exaggerated that demand by selling panaceas for mental health problems, both medication and psychological therapies (see eg. previous post). 

As the Big Issue article points out, the problem with coping with demand is not just in Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust. I used to work at Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust (NSFT), and as I have said on my personal blog (see eg. previous post), it also has had its institutional difficulties over the last 10 years. It has managed to correct problems in its Trust Board over recent years but services on the ground are still struggling to cope with demand. As far as beds are concerned, this is reflected in the endemic problem across the whole country of out of area placements. NSFT board recognises there is more to do to improve services but there also is a need for national direction. We are waiting to see how specific the new NHS 10-year Health Plan, postponed from June to July 2025, will be as far as mental health policy is concerned.

How we have been misled about the nature of depression

Joanna Moncrieff’s abstract for her Sowerby Project 10 year anniversary public lecture, ‘Changing our minds: How we have been misled about the nature of depression and mental disorder’, emphasises that most people generally have come to accept that it’s reasonable to believe that depression is a brain disorder which is specifically targeted by antidepressants (see lecture information). But they are being misled about the nature of depression and functional mental disorder in general (see eg. previous post). Depression has psychosocial not neurobiological causes. Antidepressants can tend to leave people feeling that there is a sense in which their psychosocial problems, which caused the depression, have not really been solved. However much they may feel that antidepressants may have helped stabilise their mood, they may, therefore, also feel emotionally flat and not back to their real self (see eg. another previous post). In fact there is a sense in which taking antidepressants can be identity altering, because reducing people to their brain does not help them to recognise and deal with the personal situation in which they find themselves. They are instead indoctrinated into believing the biomedical myth that they have a brain disorder. But their brain is only part of them, not their whole self. However difficult dealing with emotional problems may be, blaming the brain is not the right solution.

There can, nonetheless, seem to be advantages in taking on the biomedical myth. Not that people should necessarily be blamed for what has happened to them or who they are. But by believing that their problems have been caused by their brain, their difficulties may then be seen as out of their control and not their responsibility. However much that may well be the case, it’s still wrong to do so for biomedical reasons and cannot justify such speculation. Psychiatry has always had a tendency to encourage biomedical thinking because it seems to simplify reasons for depression and other mental disorders (see eg. previous post). Understanding reasons for such problems can be difficult and can never actually be proven, whereas the biomedical myth offers an apparent underlying physical scientific cause.

The biomedical myth will therefore survive. People will continue to wish that the cause of functional mental illness will eventually be found in the brain. But the disadvantages, not just the truth, of the biomedical myth need to be considered. People are being made too dependent on antidepressants. Withdrawal problems are common and can be severe if only because of what antidepressants have come to mean to people. Psychiatric patients often stay on medications, maybe several at once, even though their actual benefit is questionable. Any change threatens an equilibrium related to a complex set of meanings that their medications have acquired. People are being made to think that they need a pill and become fearful about trying to manage without the drug. These issues of dependence should not be minimised, yet commonly treatment is reinforced by emphasising that antidepressants are not addictive. 

There’s no point looking to mainstream psychiatry to resolve the increasing use of antidepressants, because the profession exists currently to defend the use of psychotropic medication. This is not likely to change soon. Psychiatry may have had phases of being more open minded and pluralistic in its approach, but it has always been attracted to biomedical understandings of mental illness. People find it difficult to accept there are limits to our understanding of human nature, which they think should be explicable in physical terms. Powerful vested interests in defending this belief mean psychiatry does not really want to change.

Vision for mental health policy

Penelope Campling’s book On the brink with patients’ stories from her life in psychiatry starts at the end of the asylum years, when many of us, as she says, were optimistic about the development of community care. But as I keep saying (see eg. previous post), mental health care, like much of NHS provision, has become too dysfunctional and fragmented. As I’ve also said before (see eg. another previous post), in many ways we are now repeating the worst days of the asylum in the community. 

Rights and recovery-orientated services need to be at the centre not the margins of mental health services (see eg. previous post). There were many strengths in the last Labour government’s mental health strategy (see my Mental Health Policy website, developed at the time, although several links are now defunct). Certainly it seemed to give far better direction than has been the case since Gordon Brown’s government lost the election. Where I think new Labour did not do so well was in managing concern about public safety in the context of the rundown of the asylum. There has been a reinstutionalisation of mental health services over recent years, perhaps most reflected in the increase in secure beds in both the public and particularly the private sector. This has been associated with an inappropriate over-preoccupation with risk in services. Risk is not always best handled by increasing coercion. Risk management needs to be more sensibly based on assessment, formulation and management of risk rather than the failed reliance on risk prediction (see eg. another previous post). 

The current Community Mental Health Framework for Adults and Older Adults to transform mental health services has been too non-specific in providing direction and there has been insufficient progress in  its implementation (see eg. previous post). Community Mental Health Teams have become too large and need to be devolved so that there is one in every Primary Care Network (PCN). The PCN mental health teams also need to work alongside non-medical mental health hubs, one of which again should be in each PCN. We wait to see how specific the new NHS 10-year Health Plan, due in June 2025, will be as far as mental health policy is concerned. 

Taking the debate about antidepressants forward

Joanna Moncrieff’s book Chemically imbalanced at least seems to have ruffled a few feathers, as it has led to a Lancet editorial. It’s not clear, though, from the editorial how the debate about antidepressants can be taken forward.

Of course many people say they have been helped by antidepressants. But the question is whether the outcome is any better than placebo. Although short-term clinical trials show a significant advantage for antidepressant over placebo, the effect size is small and there is a substantial non-response rate. Over the long-term recurrence is high and many still report residual symptoms. Moreover, it is possible that the significant difference in short-term trials is an artefact because of methodological problems, such as unblinding. Making people dependent on antidepressants is not necessarily in their best interest.

Mainstream psychiatry and medicine in general will never accept that antidepressants are ineffective. Unless people themselves no longer wish to see their mental health difficulties as biologic and are no longer interested in oversimplistic resolution of them by a pill or a bit of psychological therapy, then psychiatry will continue to exploit the placebo effect. The Lancet editorial is right to conclude we remain a long way from providing the level of mental health care that so many people need. It’s been a mistake to look for the solution in psychotropic medication.

Making psychiatry more open-minded

Peter Gøtzsche is not joking when he asks if psychiatrists are more mad than their patients (see his Mad in America blog post). I understand what he means about the wishful thinking of biomedical psychiatrists (see eg. previous post). 

It’s important not to distance ourselves from people with whom we just disagree by labelling them insane (see eg. previous post). Even those who are truly delusional because of the idiosyncratic, solipsistic self-centrality of their belief system (see eg. another previous post), which may well only be temporary, have got to that position because it is the only way they can make sense of the situation in which they find themselves (see eg. yet another previous post). Delusional beliefs make sense at least to the person that holds them.

We shouldn’t be too surprised that psychiatrists tend to adopt the biomedical views they do. For example, the belief that brain pathology is the basis for major mental illness helps to avoid having to deal with complicated metaphysics about the mind–body problem. It also appears to bring psychiatry closer to the rest of medicine by seeing mental illness as having a material basis as do physical ill­nesses in general. Furthermore, it also creates a scientific ambition and associated research programme to uncover the neuroscientific causes of mental illness, which attracts massive amounts of research funding. All these wishes and desires are understandable, but they may be more based on faith than science. Peter is right to object to the pseudoscientific nature of much of modern psychiatry (see eg. previous post).

Difficulties of psychiatrists identifying with their profession

I’ve mentioned the 1996 article by David Kaiser ‘Against biologic psychiatry’ in a previous post. He described why he found it increasingly difficult for him as a psychiatrist to identify with his profession. Biologic psychiatry seems to have become even more dominant since then with the increasing overmedicalisation of psychiatry (see eg. previous post) and fragmentation and dysfunction of services (see eg. another previous post). Questioning biologic psychiatry’s beliefs and actions does not seem to have served as a wake-up call for psychiatry leading to very much change (see eg. yet another previous post). 

As Kaiser said:-

It seems to me that modern psychiatry is acting out a cultural fantasy having to do with the wish for an omniscient authority who, armed with modern science, will magically take away the suffering and pain inherent in existing as human beings, and that rather than refusing this projection (which psychoanalysts were better able to do), modern psychiatry has embraced the role wholeheartedly, reveling in its new-found power and cultural legitimacy.

Speaking out against biologic psychiatry’s ideology seems to be insufficient. Unless people themselves no longer wish to see their difficulties as biologic and are no longer interested in oversimplistic resolution of them by a pill or a bit of psychological therapy (see eg. previous post), then psychiatry will continue to exploit this situation for its own ends. 

Assessing the risks of psychotropic medication

The executive order establishing the US President’s Make America Healthy Again Commission has caused concern amongst leading psychiatric organisations because it proposes to assess the prevalence of and threat posed by the prescription of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), antipsychotics, mood stabilizers and stimulants  (see Psychiatric Times article). As far as these psychiatric organisations are concerned psychiatric drugs are safe, effective and can be life-saving (see joint statement). They urge the Federal Government not to disregard the critical role played by the appropriate use of evidence-based psychotropic medications in the treatment of individuals with psychiatric conditions that carry inherent high risks for suicide or other dangerous or life-threatening behaviors. 

At face value it seems difficult to see why the Commission should not give due consideration to the value of psychotropic medication. If such medications are so safe, effective and life-saving, why should an assessment of their risks cause such concern?

As I have said before, mainstream psychiatry will never accept that psychiatric medications are not effective (see eg. previous post). But it does need to acknowledge the limits and potential disadvantages and harms of such medication. Overstating the case for psychotropic medication is not necessarily in the interests of patients, even if it may suit the institution of psychiatry. Maybe only the politicians can effectively counter such institutional bias.

Drug regulator thinks it’s reasonable to mislead people about chemical imbalance in depression

In a reply to a letter from Peter Gøtzsche, the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) has made clear that it has no current plans to remove the references to chemical imbalance in the Patient Information Leaflets (PILs) of antidepressants (see reply). A previous reply to a freedom of information request has helped to clarify the history of the introduction of this term into such PILs.

The chemical imbalance theory of depression has never been more than a hypothesis (see eg. previous post). The trouble with MHRA maintaining its position is that it gives credence to the idea that the hypothesis has been proven, which is clearly not the case. It seems willing to let people be misled about the nature of depression. Its bias in promoting antidepressants needs to be exposed.

Easy solutions to psychological problems?

Psychological problems are common. People don't always adjust to difficulties in life and relationships very well. They don't always meet their own or others' expectations of how they should function socially.

Solutions on offer to psychological problems from mental health services, such as psychotropic medication and talking therapy, may, therefore, seem attractive. This can mean that the limits to treatment are not always acknowledged or recognised. Wishful thinking can be powerful and self-fulfilling.

The trouble is that this situation means that providing increasing resources for mental health services can never meet the perceived need of the population  (see eg. my BMJ article with corrections - see previous post). Psychological problems are real and the role of mental health services is to respond to them and provide care until normal social roles can be resumed. No wonder mental health services are in difficulty if they think that panaceas to mental health problems are the answer (see eg. another previous post). 

Psychiatry is doomed to conflict about the value of psychiatric medication

Doctors have always exaggerated the advantages of medication. But medication, including recreational drugs, can’t just be eliminated. There are plenty of people that say that psychiatric medication has helped, despite its disadvantages (see eg. previous post). This experience cannot be denied, even if it is due to the placebo effect. Mainstream psychiatry will never accept that psychiatric medication is not effective.

What may be more important is that people are being misled about the nature of mental health problems (see eg. previous post). People are more than their brains. Of course brain abnormalities can produce mental health problems, such as dementia and delirium. But most mental health problems are not due to brain abnormalities.  People are limited by their bodies, true. But it’s their social experiences that determine how mental health problems present. This may be because of their past or present experiences. It’s important to try and understand why people have mental health problems because of their experiences, even if the causes can’t be proven as such. Trouble is that people are looking for definitive answers, which is why they latch onto the idea that mental health problems may be due to their brain. 

Psychiatry will continue to take advantage of people, including prescribing them medication. But it needs to change to be more focussed on people rather than its own prestige and financial interests (see eg. previous post). 

Sticking to the argument about whether antidepressants work

I worry that the clash between Joanna Moncrieff and Awais Aftab about her new book Chemically imbalanced has become too personal (see eg. last post). For example, Awais’ recent blog post criticises Jo for her methods rather than necessarily actually what she says. In many ways, how Jo expresses her critique is irrelevant. What matters is the content of what she says.

Awais Aftab wants to see integrative and critical pluralism as a variant of critical psychiatry (see previous post). But he’s only semi-critical and does not follow through properly on his critique. And he believes antidepressants and other psychotropic medications work, whereas critical psychiatrists such as Jo, are more sceptical, if not convinced of their non-effectiveness, which Jo has been brave enough to say.

As we saw with the Simon Wessely debate with Jo on the This morning TV programme (see clip), mainstream psychiatry will not allow Jo to say that antidepressants do not work. I have always been cautious about making such a definitive statement, even if expressing to people, including my patients, my belief that it may well be true. I’m not sure how to prove the so-called placebo amplification hypothesis even if I agree with Jo that there is considerable evidence in its favour (see eg. previous post).

Indoctrinating people into taking antidepressants

People are being misled about the nature of mental illness. Of course brain abnormalities can cause organic mental illness, such as delirium or dementia. But most presentations of mental health problems are not caused by brain abnormalities. 

Using depression as an example, people have been encouraged to see depression as a chemical imbalance in the brain. Because SSRI antidepressants are said specifically to block reuptake of serotonin from the synaptic cleft between neurones, it has been suggested that they must be correcting a serotonin deficiency in the brain. Although doctors may have realised that such an explanation of the effect of antidepressants is at least an oversimplification, they have allowed the general public to go along with the idea. In fact people have often believed the chemical imbalance theory to be proven. They have accepted, even been told, this myth to provide a reason for needing to take their antidepressants. Hence the controversy created by Joanna Moncrieff’s recent book Chemically imbalanced: The making and unmaking of the serotonin myth (see eg. previous post and Jo’s response). 

More generally, depression tends to be seen as a brain disease. Of course people recognise that personal and social factors may also be important, but still the brain causation of depression tends to predominate as an aetiological factor. This is a fundamental misindoctrination of people that their brains determine what they think, feel and do. Of course the brain is needed for human functioning, as is the whole body, but people are more than their brains. It is a mistake to blame the brain for depression as much as it is for what we think, feel and do in general. We are not teaching our children a proper understanding of themselves (see eg. previous post). No wonder the demand for children’s mental health services, and mental health services in general, is out of control (see eg. another previous post). 

Depression is real but not a concrete thing

Functional mental illness is an abstract not concrete concept. It differs from organic mental illness where there is brain dysfunction.

Illnesses tend to be seen as “things” which people “have” (see eg. previous post). Since the nineteenth century with the elucidation of pathological mechanisms, our positive understanding has become that the “thing” that people “have” is a diseased organ or bodily system. This model fits for organic mental illness such as dementia or delirium. For example, organic mental illness can be caused by a primary brain disorder or be secondary to a systemic illness. But functional mental illness, such as depression, is not primarily due to brain disease, although it can arise as a secondary consequence of illness. People are depressed, not their brains.

People of course are not separate from their bodies. They are alive, not machines, and embedded in their environment, which is social and cultural. Their bodies and environment afford various possibilities of action to them. Mechanistic dysfunctions of body parts may help to explain disease and why the person is ill. But the experience of illness is not necessarily due to diseased body parts. 

Depression, therefore, needs to be understood as a personal illness not a bodily disease caused by brain dysfunction. Its social implications can mean that various roles cannot be fulfilled, such as being able to go to work. It is not simply curable by willpower and motivation and, therefore, the person themselves should not be blamed for their illness. The expectation is that people will try to recover as quickly as possible with appropriate help and care if necessary. 

None of these social implications of illness necessarily require the presence of bodily disease to be entitled to the rights and obligations of the sick role (see eg. previous post). Such illness is not concrete in the sense of being caused by bodily mechanisms. But, functional mental illness, such as depression, even though abstract rather than concrete, is still real and valid. Regarding depression as a physical thing in the brain is a category error and does not make sense (see eg. previous post). 

The disadvantages of antidepressants

As I’ve said before (see eg. previous post), I’m inclined to believe that antidepressants are no better than placebo. I can’t prove this but it is possible that the statistical difference between antidepressant and placebo in short-term clinical trials is an artefact because of methodological problems, such as unblinding (see eg. another previous post). Nor do antidepressants over the long-term necessarily produce good outcomes (see yet another previous post). Treating depression is not always as easy as we might hope. 

I just wanted to elaborate on what the consequences are if antidepressants are really no better than placebo. Of course the nature of placebo in this sense is that it is given inadvertently (see eg. my BMJ letter). Doctors do not knowingly prescribe antidepressants as placebos. In fact, as advocates of antidepressants they can react vehemently against suggestions that antidepressants do not work (see eg. previous post). Nor do patients assume that antidepressants are placebo, perhaps especially if the medication has a positive effect. They are more likely to ascribe any improvement to a true antidepressant effect of the medication. Faith in antidepressants is commonly reinforced by the belief that medication improves a brain problem causing depression such as a chemical imbalance (see eg. another previous post). 

I’m not wanting to undermine people’s faith in medication. It’s important we have a balanced view of the advantages and disadvantages of antidepressants (see eg. previous post). We have to live with the uncertainty of the ongoing debate about the efficacy of antidepressants (see eg. another previous post), however much some people may want to close that debate down and conclude that antidepressants are definitely effective.

If we have to accept the uncertainty about the advantages of antidepressants, perhaps looking at the potential disadvantages will help us better assess their value. Doctors have always underestimated the difficulties in withdrawing from antidepressants (see eg. previous post) and the extent to which doctors are making people dependent on antidepressants (see eg. another previous post). Patients are not always warned about the risks of stopping antidepressants when they first start them, which they should be. Even if doctors routinely provided this warning, people can still naturally become fearful that discontinuing medication may upset the mental equilibrium they have managed to achieve with antidepressants after being depressed (see yet another previous post). Patients may believe the antidepressant is maintaining that equilibrium, whether it has been the cause of the improvement or whether changes have happened for other reasons. In other words, people can form attachments to their medication more because of what they mean to them than what they actually do (see my article). Any change threatens an apparent stability related to the meanings that the medications have acquired over time. It may, therefore, be easier to stay on medication than stop it. Considering also the difficulties people can have when they do try to stop, it is not surprising that people can stay on medication for long periods of time. They can be left in a vicious cycle of wanting to discontinue medication but feeling compelled to continue. 

Furthermore, people can often be left with the sense that antidepressants have masked the real problem or altered their experience of themselves and relationships with others (see previous post). This is to be expected if antidepressants act as placebos, because taking antidepressants in a way masks the ‘real problem’. This experience is commonly expressed by patients as a flattening of emotional responses or emotional numbing (see eg. another previous post). 

Withdrawal problems and not feeling one has made a proper recovery are high prices to pay for taking antidepressants. It’s understandable people are attracted to the offer of antidepressant medication relief from what may well have been a desperate situation when depressed. However, if we can’t necessarily say that antidepressants are any better than placebo, and the medication can leave people with these drawbacks, which are caused because antidepressants are placebos, then have they really helped? More people seem to be deciding the harms caused are not worth starting antidepressants.

The sorry state of modern academic psychiatry

I’m not sure who advised the king about the appointment of Ed Bullmore as Regius Professor of Psychiatry at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience (IoPPN) at King’s College London (see announcement). I wrote a satirical, even rude, review of Bullmore’s book The inflamed mind a few years ago (see previous post). As I’ve always said, psychiatry has been too dominated by biomedical psychiatrists, like Bullmore (see eg. previous post). I haven’t always been totally complimentary either about Simon Wessely, the first incumbent of the Regius post (see eg. previous post). Nor do I think he’s made as much of reforming the Mental Health Act (see another previous post) as he had the opportunity to do (see yet another previous post). 

As I said in another previous post, modern academic psychiatry started in this country with the appointment in 1948 of Aubrey Lewis as Professor of Psychiatry at the Maudsley Hospital medical school, which changed its name to the Institute of Psychiatry, now IoPPN. Lewis had a much more sceptical scientific approach to psychiatry than Bullmore. Academic psychiatry’s emphasis has changed to be more biomedical since the start of the psychopharmacology era in the 1950s (see eg. another previous post). The limits of biomedical research do need to be recognised (see eg. yet another previous post), but I’m afraid Ed Bullmore will not lead the necessary changes.

Emotional blunting more a reflection that antidepressants don’t work than how they do

I’ve mentioned before my concerns about the notion that antidepressants work through being emotional suppressants (see eg. previous post). In fact, I’m more inclined to think antidepressants don’t work any better than placebo (see eg. last post), so there’s no need to explain how antidepressants ‘work’, as such. Although the emotional numbness theory has been promoted by Joanna Moncrieff, in her recent book she does qualify this hypothesis by saying she thinks “we should be cautious about assuming emotional numbing can be useful”. 

I’m more inclined to see emotional numbing as a reflection of the fact that antidepressants don’t work, than as an explanation for how they do. Many people are left feeling emotionally numb after being on antidepressants, particularly long-term (see eg. previous post). There is a sense in which taking antidepressants masks the real problem, particularly if depression is understood as physically caused, for example by a chemical imbalance, rather than having psychosocial origins. One’s view of oneself can be at stake in taking antidepressants (see eg. previous post). Undermining of emotional authenticity is not necessarily beneficial. Believing antidepressants are helpful may seem to produce apparent improvement, for example by counteracting demoralisation, but over the longer term such a perception may also leave people feeling dulled, numbed, flattened, blocked, blank, flat or apathetic, affecting their relationships with others and how they see themselves. Many people do initially feel released from these constrictions when they first stop antidepressants, but are then left with the difficulties of managing without them, which may well not be easy, because they have become so dependent (see eg. previous post).

Confusing brain and placebo effects of antidepressants

Jo Moncrieff in her new book Chemically imbalanced (see eg. previous post) discusses Peter Kramer’s 1993 book Listening to Prozac (see Wikipedia entry), which I mentioned in a previous post. As the New York Times said at the time (see article) Kramer’s best seller described “how Prozac … transformed his patients, making them calm, confident, cheerful and somehow better than well”. Jo admits that the miraculous transformations reported could have been “largely a function of the hype accompanying the introduction of a new medication” in the same way “as those described by Roland Kuhn in relation to imipramine” (see previous post). But she also uses Kramer’s book to support her speculation that antidepressants reduce people’s emotional sensitivity.

I have expressed concern before about how Jo talks about SSRIs causing emotional numbing or reduced emotional sensitivity (see eg. previous post). I agree there is a sense in which the placebo effect does not really deal with people’s underlying emotional problems. But Jo wants to argue that antidepressants work through their brain effects as well as their placebo effects. This is because she wants to build on her distinction between the disease-centred and drug-centred models of psychotropic drug action. I think it is possible to have an outcome-based understanding of antidepressant drug action without necessarily postulating that antidepressants work through their brain effects (drug-centred model in Jo’s terms) (see previous post). Antidepressants can be powerful placebos because of their effects caused through how people understand them (see eg. previous post).

Psychiatry misleading the public about chemical imbalance in depression

Awais Aftab has responded (see his blog post) to the Sunday Times magazine article about Joanna Moncrieff (see eg. previous post). He raises various useful questions about Jo's position but tends to be very critical of her perspective. It's possible some of the questions he raises may be answered in Jo's new book, due to be published this week. Nonetheless, Awais accepts that the "chemical imbalance story as it existed in the public imagination has little scientific legitimacy".

However, Awais seems to want to exclude psychiatry from any responsibility for people believing the chemical imbalance theory of depression. This seems difficult to justify (see eg. previous post). Awais admits that the chemical imbalance theory has been so vague that it has been left "up to patients and the public to make of it what they want". Why has psychiatry allowed this situation to continue? It must have suited its interests. I have always argued that psychiatry allows, even perpetuates the myth, because it wants people to take their medication (see eg. my BMJ eletter). Psychiatry is so wedded to the notion of antidepressant effectiveness that it allows people to be misled by how antidepressants work (if they do).

Of course psychiatry will say that even though the chemical imbalance theory is too simplistic, then antidepressants still work through their effects on the brain. Even this claim needs to be challenged (see last post).

Daring to argue that depression is not a physical disease

I mentioned the Sunday Times magazine article about Joanna Moncrieff in my last post, where I focused on the issue of whether antidepressants work. I also wanted to pick up what the article says in its introductory rubric about Jo daring to argue that depression is not a physical disease.

At face value, saying that depression is not a physical disease may not appear to be so much of a challenge to psychiatry. After all, depression is a mental not a physical illness, isn’t it? Why should psychiatry find such a view so threatening?

Jo emphasises in the article that making appropriate changes in one’s life is a way of tackling depression. Mainstream psychiatry does not always promote such social treatment of depression. Instead it encourages antidepressant medication, which tends to rely on regarding depression as a physical illness. Antidepressants tend to be seen as having physical effects on the brain, correcting, or at least helping to correct, the brain problem causing depression. Even if no brain abnormality is hypothesised in depression, antidepressants are still regarded as affecting or improving brain functioning. 

The chemical imbalance theory is therefore a way of promoting the idea that antidepressants counteract the brain problem causing depression. Most psychiatrists, if pressed, will admit this theory is too simplistic (see eg. previous post). But nonetheless they continue to look for brain abnormalities in depression, even being unprepared to give up implicating serotonin in the mechanism (see eg. another previous post). 

Psychiatry has always been caught in the philosophical mind-body problem. There has always been a fundamental conflict between psychic and somatic approaches to mental illness. It’s just that mainstream psychiatry has become too dependent on physical approaches, particularly over recent years with the development of psychopharmacology. This is why it finds it such a challenge that psychotropic medication may be no better than placebo, as I discussed in my last post.

I have always argued that psychiatry should not find such a challenge so threatening (see eg. my edited Critical psychiatry book). Before the psychopharmacology era, psychiatry did have a broadly conceived view of mental illness as being psychosocially caused. Of course this did not mean that physical factors were ignored. But most presentations to psychiatrists were accepted as having functional rather than organic causes. Over recent years this differentiation has become fudged (see eg. previous post). In fact, DSM-IV wrongly abolished the distinction (see eg. another previous post). Psychiatry is too keen to avoid metaphysical questions about how the mind relates to the brain.

The trouble is that this means that people can be reduced to their brains. The truth is that primary mental illness cannot be reduced to brain disease (see eg. previous post). Brain language has wrongly permeated our conception of ourselves over recent years (see eg. another previous post). But altered subjective experiences and disturbed reactions to others are essential elements of functional mental illness and not merely epiphenomena of a causal organic process. As I keep saying, psychiatry must stop reducing people to their brains. Restricting its interventions to psychopharmacology inevitably does so.

The legitimacy of asking whether antidepressants work

The Sunday Times magazine has an article about Joanna Moncrieff promoting the publication this week of her new book, Chemically imbalanced: The making and unmaking of the serotonin myth. This follows the 2022 umbrella review, of which she was the first author, which concluded that there is no consistent evidence of an association between serotonin and depression, and no support for the hypothesis that depression is caused by lowered serotonin activity or concentrations (see previous post). This conclusion has caused controversy within mainstream psychiatry that wants to hold on to the idea that serotonin is implicated in depression (see eg. another previous post). This is because it believes that antidepressants work and wants to suggest that their effect on the serotonin system must be something to do with the mechanism.

The efficacy of antidepressants is a legitimate scientific question and my reading of the evidence is that the issue is still open, despite mainstream psychiatry’s insistence the issue is closed. Jo is not convinced antidepressants have any use. There is little doubt that short-term trials of antidepressants on average show a small significant difference above placebo. But because of methodological problems with the clinical trials this apparent benefit may be an artefact (see eg. previous post).

The placebo effect is powerful. Doctors have always exploited the placebo effect. Their beliefs and hopes about treatment, combined with patients’ suggestibility, can have an apparent therapeutic effect. Participants’ subjective beliefs about receiving active or placebo treatment in a clinical trial can significantly influence the assessment of the outcome of treatment. Whether antidepressants are mere placebo treatment is, therefore, a legitimate open scientific question (see eg. previous post). It should be possible to have this debate in public without having to label Jo as notorious. 

Discovering what psychiatry’s really like

I talked about Jan Foudraine in the first chapter of my edited Critical Psychiatry book. As I said, he became the ‘personal ambassador' in Holland of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh or Osho, as he later came to be called. Osho was an Indian spiritual leader who preached an eclectic doctrine of Eastern mysticism, individual devotion, and sexual freedom while amassing vast personal wealth (see Foudraine’s obituary on the Osho website). My original idea was that the presentation Foudraine gave at a 2001 Critical Psychiatry Network conference, which I organised, would be included as a chapter in my book. However, I never received his consent, so it did not appear in the the published version.

As I also say in my chapter, Foudraine wrote the best selling book Not made of wood (1974). To his surprise, this book became an immediate bestseller. More than 200,000 copies were sold and later the book appeared in seven translations. I have been re-reading a manuscript that Jan sent me - ‘The man who dropped out of his mind: Pointers from a rebellious mystic’.

It’s interesting looking back how popular anti-psychiatry, represented by Foudraine amongst others, was at the time (see eg. previous post). As Jan said in the presentation and manuscript, becoming a mega-seller made him into “some sort of Jesus Christ of psychiatry”. The same happened to R.D. Laing (see eg. previous post) after his books were republished by Penguin. Laing was taken up by the 1960s counterculture and always hankered to return and be accepted by mainstream psychiatry, but once he had become infamous this was not possible.

Jan admits in the manuscript that Not made of wood was “almost naive”. He said, “The experience of being a so-called famous ‘anti-psychiatrist’ led to much loneliness and despair”. This made him realise “the undeniable fact that this whole planet looked … very much like one big insane asylum”. He went into a personal crisis over several years with a sense of utter emptiness that the follow-up to his success had created. He was rescued from this mental state by his lightening-like realisation of the Truth. He read books and listened to audiotapes giving a discourse on Zen by Osho, as he became known, and went to Poona to “land right at the blessed feet” of his Guru. Foudraine published a book in 1979 entitled Original face, a journey home, although it was never translated from the Dutch, declaring his love for Osho, of whom he became his disciple. He described his mystical communion with Osho, who he thought was genuinely wise in his belief that “humanity is committing a collective suicide”. 

Laing too went on retreat to Ceylon and India in 1971. As I wrote in my book chapter 'Historical perspectives on anti-psychiatry', this retreat could be said to have symbolised a lack of commitment to changing psychiatry. The difficulty in changing psychiatry is real and I have often commented in this blog about how hard it is to get the message of critical/relational psychiatry accepted (see eg. previous post). Overcoming the power of the prevailing biomedical structure in psychiatry, and medicine in general, is not easy. I have always argued that any critique of psychiatry needs to accept that there will not be a paradigm shift away from biomedical psychiatry, however much it may hope for one. Still, psychiatry can become, and needs to be, more open and therapeutic in its practice. But I think it is likely to remain a conflictual area of clinical practice. 

So, rather that being deflected from the conflict involved in trying to change psychiatry to promoting personal authenticity, as were both Foudraine and Laing, the differences within mental health practice do need to be acknowledged and accepted. Foundraine's mystical solution to the dilemma of psychiatry does need to be respected, even if I don't personally accept it.

What does it mean to be diagnosed with ADHD?

Owen Jones is a succesful Guardian journalist. He was central to the Jeremy Corbyn movement. He feels as though he has been held back by his ADHD, and obtained this diagnosis over a year ago (see his YouTube video). The charity ADHD UK was founded in 2020. It aims to help people like Owen Jones navigate their life with ADHD, and wants to reduce the stigma that some people attach to those with ADHD, build awareness, and undertake or fund research that will have a meaningful positive impact on those with ADHD. 

I’ve never sought a psychiatric diagnosis to explain my inadequacies or failures, or medication to treat them, although I did have twice-weekly psychotherapy for 3 years until my therapist retired. I do think psychiatry can be beneficial, although it can also cause harms. It worries me that people are being misled about the nature of ADHD (see eg. previous post). 

I’m not sure what Jones now thinks of his ADHD diagnosis and treatment after a year. Psychiatry has moved on from its modern origins in diagnosing madness (see eg. previous post). Incorporating neurodivergence over recent years has broadened its remit. Whether this has always been beneficial is at least an open question.

Psychiatry needs to be more thoughtful

Linda Gask, who I have mentioned before (see eg. previous post), has reviewed Conversations in critical psychiatry (2024) edited by Awais Aftab (see her review and eg. my comment about the book in a previous post). As she says, reading the book reminds her of when she first tried to make sense of psychiatry in her training. Such an experience of trying to make sense of psychiatry in the wake of the so-called anti-psychiatry of the time was common for our generation of psychiatrists (see eg. my MIA radio interview). For example, I've mentioned before (see eg. previous post and my article) Simon Wessely's description of how he went through this process  and was rescued by the book Psychiatry in dissent (1976) by Anthony Clare. As I said in my comment about Awais's edited book, there is a sense in which his book is trying to rescue psychiatry from the more recent critical psychiatry movement, in the same way as Clare did with anti-psychiatry.

As Linda says, she has "never identified with the British version of ‘critical psychiatry’, finding it rather like having to adopt a complete ideology that will only consider hypotheses that are self-confirmatory". I'm not exactly sure what she means by this. If critical psychiatry's ideology is so self-confirmatory, why don't more psychiatrists and people in general go along with it? As I've said several times (eg. see previous post), critical psychiatry has found it very difficult to get its message across. Nonetheless I agree with Linda's conclusion to her review that:-

We need to encourage those training to be psychiatrists to not only be more thoughtful but listen to as many patients’ stories as they can and read widely, even the work of those they are convinced they will disagree with.