Misleading the public about mental health

Matthew Parris’s Times article entitled ‘Mental health industry is cheating the public’ led to some overdefensive responses from mainstream psychiatry (see Letters). Parris may have overstated his case but, for example, the diagnosis of neurodivergence is out of control (see eg. previous post). It’s legitimate to question whether psychiatry is a science, considering the pseudoscientific claims made by biomedical psychiatry (see eg. another previous post). There have been serious problems with the application of Personal Independence Payments (PIP) since it replaced Disability Living Allowance (see post on my personal blog). Although the economically inactive may not be choosing not to work, as ineptly expressed by Parris, why so many people are not working is a legitimate social question. Mental health problems are definitely being overmedicalised (see eg. yet another previous post) and people do not want to hear that message. 

Will the mistakes of the past be repeated in Mental Health Act reform?

The government has been reported (see Guardian article) as being prepared to slow down Mental Health Act (MHA) reform following the Care Quality Commission (CQC) review of the homicides by Valdo Calocane. Wes Streeting, Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, has been quoted (see another Guardian article) as saying that “three innocent people might still be alive” if the NHS had “done its job” in treating Calocane. As I said in a previous post, it has been a mistake for mental health services no longer to be prioritising assertive outreach (AO) for people with serious mental health problems, like Calocane. This does not necessarily mean reintroducing separate AO teams as previously, but the AO function needs to be restored and prioritised in an integrated, functioning community mental health service.

I welcome time being taken to give proper consideration to the issues of MHA reform, as they do need to be got right and we need to learn from mistakes made following similar tragedies in the past. For example, a 2006 Observer article was written by the father of a man with a 17 year history of schizophrenia who, even though the father accepted that his son’s illness was difficult to treat, wanted to know why the mental health system, of which he was very critical, could not cope. The article appeared in the week following publication of a report into the care of John Barrett, who killed a stranger in Richmond Park, and which was said to reveal a litany of failures in his care. Homicide inquiries all tend to have the same findings that there is a need for improvement in risk assessment, communication, care planning and interagency working. These factors need to be improved in all mental health cases, not just those that lead to homicide. To focus on enforced treatment in the community (Community Treatment Orders (CTOs)) has been a distraction from the need to provide consistent, high quality community care by improving these aspects for all mental health care.

The more recent Guardian articles above show we are still facing similar problems in mental health services today to 2006 before CTOs were introduced. Part of the answer of the patient’s father then was that services were not sufficiently realistic about the lack of insight of people with schizophrenia and did not do enough to provide ongoing, consistent rehabilitative care, including accommodation for his son. Unfortunately services are still not always prioritising and providing high quality care for those with severe mental illness. This is where the focus for improvement should be.

The article was written before the last Labour government amended the MHA in 2007 to introduce community treatment orders (CTOs) amongst other changes. An Observer editorial accompanied this article and several letters were published in response. A Mental Health Bill, which led to the 2007 amendments to the Act, had already been introduced. Rosie Winterton, Minister of State for Mental Health at the time, in one of the published letters, argued that MHA reform was necessary to introduce CTOs to deal with the situation described by the father of the man diagnosed with schizophrenia. She seems to have seen CTOs as the answer to the then failing mental health system.

If services are still so dysfunctional and fragmented, why did CTOs not work? I posted then that CTOs “could well make the culture of mental health services worse by making them more custodial and less therapeutic”, suggesting that CTOs were “not the correct response to the bureaucratic, defensive failings of mental health services” described in the article. Mental health services need to be supported in providing high quality care, rather than being made fearful they will be attacked when something goes wrong. Mental health services have unfortunately become more fearful about what might go wrong in mental health services, rather than concentrating on the task of improving things for people with mental health problems.

The Critical Psychiatry Network (CPN), of which I am a founding member produced a position statement on CTOs in 2007. It argued that it was unethical to apply the MHA to force people to take treatment in the community when they are functioning well enough to be living in the community and have capacity to decide about their treatment. The use of force to remove someone from their home and take them to a "clinical setting" to force them to take medication cannot be justified and exacerbates stigma. CTOs can also frighten people away from psychiatric services, when these are just the people that need to be encouraged to keep in touch with services through informal assertive outreach. The temptation is just to continue CTOs once they are in place, because it is difficult to prove the negative that the person is well enough to be discharged once a decision has been made in the first place that they are justified. Having CTOs as an option, even expectation for some, means that the use of S17 leave and informal community care follow-up is not explored as much as it should be. These informal arrangements could lead to just as good, if not better outcomes (see eg. previous post). The number of people detained under CTOs has been far more than anticipated and they are discriminatory in their application (see eg. another previous post). The years since CTOs were implemented have just confirmed all the fears expressed in the 2007 CPN position statement.

This blog has consistently argued that psychiatry needs to move on from an outdated belief in mental illness as brain disease (see eg. previous post). Mental health practice does need to be rethought (see eg. another previous post). A new 10-year plan for mental health is required. This includes reform of the MHA following recommendations from the Parliamentary Scrutiny Commitee and WHO/OHCHR guidelines (see eg. yet another previous post).

I would go further than working towards abolishing CTOs for civil detentions (see eg. previous post). The Mental Health Tribunal needs to become the Mental Health Rights Tribunal with a single judge hearing appeals on both treatment and detention decisions (see eg. another previous post). Tribunals need to provide robust and objective accountability and effective protection for people with mental health problems. Medical evidence can come from the RC and an independent expert from a new integrated advocacy service of mental health lawyers, IMHAs and independent experts (see eg. yet another previous post). Advocacy services need to help detained patients exercise their rights by assisting patients to access legal advice and support at Tribunal hearings. Second Opinion Approved Doctors (SOADs) could then be abolished. If any hiatus in MHA reform leads to all these issues being taken forward, then all well and good from my point of view.

Pro-psychiatry and psychiatric diagnosis

I've mentioned before Andrew Scull's (2023) article which claims that David Rosenhan's (1973) 'On being sane in insane places' is a "spectacularly successful case of scientific fraud" (see previous post). I agree the evidence suggests Rosenhan at least exaggerated his finding that people could gain admission to psychiatric hospital and mislead psychiatrists into diagnosing schizophrenia to reinforce his belief that psychiatric diagnosis is subjective and does not reflect inherent patient characteristics.

What I want to emphasise, though, is the importance of Rosenhan's study in reinforcing the split between so-called anti-psychiatry and pro-psychiatry. Generally I don't like people using the term 'anti-psychiatry' because it's used as a way of marginalising even legitimate critique of psychiatry (see eg. recent post). 

However, there is a sense in which we need to accept that 'anti-psychiatry' as used by mainstream psychiatry has stuck (see eg. previous post). It's seen as a passing phase in the history of psychiatry from the 1960/70s from which psychiatry has now recovered. In other words, we're now in the period of pro-psychiatry. Tom Burns suggests that four revolutionary books first published in 1960/1 by R.D. Laing, Michel Foucault, Erving Goffman and Thomas Szasz started off this period of anti-psychiatry (see another previous post).

The term 'anti-psychiatry' itself was not really introduced until 1967 by David Cooper in his books Psychiatry and anti-psychiatry (1967) and The dialectics of liberation (1968). The anti-psychiatry movement was taken up by the counter-culture to free itself from what it saw as the oppressive nature of society, which included psychiatry suppressing our true potentialities. With the waning of the counter-culture, anti-psychiatry is also seen as having faded away in significance.

However, the anti-authoritarian, popular, even romantic, attack on psychiatrists' use of diagnosis, drug and ECT treatment and involuntary hospitalisation caused a crisis for mainstream psychiatry. Rosenhan's (1973) paper on psychiatric diagnosis added to that crisis. In particular, Robert Spitzer, as Chair of the Task Force, was so panicked that psychiatric diagnosis may be unreliable that he introduced operational criteria for the definitions of psychiatric disorders in DSM-III, building on work with the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) (see eg. my article). This provided a way for psychiatry to move on from the criticisms of anti-psychiatry, including Rosenhan. 

So, even if it suits pro-psychiatry to discover that Rosenhan's study was fraudulent or at least exaggerated, it still has to deal with the fact that DSM-III was seen as necessary to counter anti-psychiatry. Although Spitzer always insisted DSM-III was atheoretical, it was associated with a resurgence of biomedical thinking in psychiatry, sometimes called neo-Kraepelinian (see eg. previous post). This is now seen as the pro-psychiatry position and any criticism may still be labelled as anti-psychiatry. 

Actually, what psychiatry needs to do is move on from this polarisation between pro-psychiatry and anti-psychiatry, which it’s still not yet done. There are legitimate critiques of the biomedical perspective in psychiatry. Although the biomedical perspective may always have been dominant, psychiatry has been more open-minded in the past and needs to return to being more open and therapeutic in its approach, rather than defending an outdated biological view of primary mental illness (see eg. my article).

Specialist clinics for deprescribing psychotropic medication

I’ve been cautious about being too prescriptive in withdrawing people from antidepressants (see eg. previous post). There should be more monitoring by doctors of people taking antidepressants (see another previous post). The full importance of antidepressant withdrawal is not yet appreciated by the medical profession in my view (see yet another previous post). 

Still, tapering is generally the best way to stop antidepressants, although some people do seem to be able to stop more easily, particularly if they have not been taking antidepressants for too long. An article in Medical Republic highlights that the Royal Australian College of GPs (RACGP) (see its press release) has made the Maudsley Deprescribing Guidlelines freely available for up to 500 members with an interest in psychology or addiction medicine. Mark Horowitz, one of the co-authors of the guidelines, is quoted in the article as saying that too many doctors recommend going back onto antidepressants when patients have withdrawal difficulties, rather than doing what they really should do is say that the drug should be stopped more carefully. I think in my clinical practice, perhaps because of the time needed to support people in withdrawal, I too easily allowed people to go back onto medication (see previous post). I support the development of more specialist clinics for deprescribing.

Mental health services should not be diagnosis-led

As I said in a previous post, services for neurodiversity should be based on need rather than diagnosis-led. Demand for assessment for neurodiversity services, particularly in young people, is out of control. This situation is being exploited by unscrupulous business practices (see eg. another previous post). 

Services should actually be provided on the basis of need for all mental health problems, not just neurodiversity (see previous post). Non-medical approaches to mental health problems can be beneficial and not everyone who attends mental health services is necessarily wanting medication. There needs to be more collaboration between NHS and non-medical mental health services to provide  an ‘integrated front door’ to services.

Assessment for mental health services is primarily about providing understanding. It’s not only about giving a name to people’s problems through a diagnosis but also about gaining some appreciation of the reasons for those problems. Of course it may not be possible to be certain about the factors involved, but that doesn’t mean that it’s not important to try and understand them. A brain problem is rarely the cause of most psychiatric presentations. People should be supported by mental health services on the basis of their need not a one-word label.

What is anti-psychiatry?

I’ve complained before that people continue to use the term ‘anti-psychiatry’ without being clear what they mean (see eg. previous post). There are people that want to abolish psychiatry and maybe that is the only way in which the term ‘antipsychiatry’ (without the hyphen) should be used (see another previous post). 

Psychiatry does need to change. The trouble with using the term anti-psychiatry is that it marginalises legitimate critique. 

Working towards abolishing community treatment orders (CTOs)

As Alex Ruck Keene said in his blog post, last week’s King’s Speech announced the introduction of a Mental Health bill to modernise the Mental Health Act (MHA) 1983. There is a sense in which it could be said to be misleading to imply that the 1983 Act has merely become out of date, which is how the government tends to present the case for reform (see previous post). Both the 1959 and 1983 Acts were progressive Acts in the sense of improving the rights of people with mental health problems. There were some progressive elements to the amendments introduced in 2007 by the previous Labour government, such as the introduction of independent advocacy, although this was never properly funded (see eg. previous post).  Essentially, however, the amended Act was a regressive step, particularly through introducing community treatment orders (CTOs). Hopefully the new Bill will actually further improve the rights of people with mental health problems (see eg. couple of tweets from Mind - first and second) and take into account WHO/OHCHR recent guidance on Mental health, human rights and legislation (see eg. previous post).

The Parliamentary Committee that scrutinised the draft Mental Health bill produced by the last government recommended that CTOs should be abolished for civil patients (see previous post). The Mental Health Alliance was formed in the context of the last Labour government’s attempt at MHA reform which led to the compromise of the 2007 amendments. There were major demonstrations against the Labour government’s proposals at the time (see eg. Early Day Motion). The Critical Psychiatry Network (CPN),  of which I am a founding member, was one of the original members of the Mental Health Alliance, although it resigned from the Alliance when it became clear that the Alliance was prepared to compromise on CTOs (see resignation letter and previous letter of concern to Alliance). Evidence since then has only essentially reinforced the view that CTOs do not work (see eg. previous post). CPN summarised its concerns about CTOs in a 2007 statement). 

The Alliance still exists and is a broader grouping than originally of mental health organisations. It does need to take on board, as does the government, the full implications of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD) (see eg. previous post). Both the World Health Organisation and the World Psychiatric Association urge countries to take action to promote non-coercive practices in mental health. This should include the UK government following the recommendation from the Parliamentary Scrutiny Committee to abolish CTOs for civil patients.

The government plans to introduce MHA reforms in phases as resources allow, and says it will not commence new powers unless there are sufficient staff in place to ensure it is safe to do so (see background briefing). Personally I’m not really convinced increasing the number of Tribunals and providing more access to SOADs and Tribunals, as proposed by the draft Bill, is really needed. It is also where more funding will be required, which could prevent implementation of any new Act. 

Reform of the Mental Health Tribunal to make it more human rights based could start now (see previous post), I think without any necessary legislative changes. Changes could also be made to improve independent advocacy by encouraging more integration between Independent Mental Health Advocates (IMHAs), mental health lawyers and independent experts (see another previous post), I think, again, without any necessary legislative changes. I suspect also that the CQC could ensure that the proposed S56 to introduce a clinical checklist to be followed by Responsible Clinicians and Second Opinion Approved Doctors (SOADs) could be implemented before such a change is reinforced and made legal in a reformed Act (see previous post). More could also be done to prevent the commissioning of secure placements by commissioners restricting, if not completely preventing, such funding for civil detentions. Work could also be undertaken on creating a new Mental Health Commissioner for England, as recommended by the Scrutiny Committee, probably incorporating and building on the current CQC MHA reviewer function (see another previous post). 

As part of taking forward its mental health strategy, the government needs to be clear that MHA reform starts now by improving patients’ rights. This programme of work can be taken forward alongside the development of a new Bill to be presented to parliament. 

The aspirations of psychiatry

King's College London press release announces that the "Wellcome Trust have awarded the funds [£5million] for a new 5-year ground-breaking research project ‘ASPIRE’, aiming to conclusively test if anti-inflammatories can be the right treatment for the right people with depression". Not sure how conclusive the results will be considering the description of the project on the Global Alliance of Mental Illness Advocacy Networks-Europe (GAMIAN-Europe) website. 

Also not quite sure what the Wellcome Trust meant a few years ago when it acknowledged that a radical new approach is needed for mental health research (see previous post), as it now seems to be allocating funding again on the same basis by wasting it on 'pie in the sky’ fantasies about what's possible with mental health treatments. I'm not wanting to polarise debate unnecessarily in psychiatry, and advocate, like Nik Rose (see previous post), for critical friendship between social sciences and neuroscience. However, I think this does need an acknowledgement from neuroscience that too much neuroscience funding is being wasted on the unattainable.

I've been ruthless in my criticism of the conceptual foundations of the psychiatry of Carmine Pariante, the primary investigator of ASPIRE (see eg. previous post). I also did a cutting, satirical review of the book by Ed Bullmore (see previous post), that made the case, like ASPIRE, for anti-inflammatory medications being used as treatment for depression by targeting the right people on the basis of levels of inflammation. To me, it's nonsensical to talk about depression as an inflammatory disorder, like rheumatoid arthritis (see eg. another previous post). More fundamentally, looking for abnormalities of inflammation in the brains of depressed people is a conceptual category error (see eg. last post). 

Summarising the argument of relational psychiatry

Depression of course is mediated via the brain but looking for abnormalities in the brain to explain why people are depressed is a category error. It is a fallacy to identify the brain with the person, in depressed people as much as in people who are not depressed.

I make this statement as a summary of the position of relational psychiatry (see eg. previous post), applying it to all functional mental illness, including schizophrenia and manic-depressive illness, not just depression. As I mentioned in a previous post, Bennett & Hacker call the category mistake of identifying the part with the whole the ‘mereological fallacy’. As I keep saying, psychiatry must stop identifying the brain with the person (see eg. another previous post). 

It is particularly people who have mental health problems who are reduced to their brains, and this is discrimination. However, such thinking permeates modern culture, reducing all people to their brains (see eg. previous post). Children are even being misled about the nature of mental illness (see eg. another previous post). What we need is a change from psychiatry being based on the notion that primary mental illness will be found to have a physical cause, to it moving on to a more relational practice (see eg. my article). 

GP monitoring of those on antidepressants

Tony Kendrick, who I have mentioned before (see eg. previous post) is the first author of a paper about antidepressant withdrawal in general practice. It found that more than 40% of patients could discontinue their antidepressant treatment in a clinical trial, comparing whether adding internet and telephone support to family practitioner review was more effective than practitioner review alone. The numbers that managed to withdraw under the two conditions was not significantly different, although those that had added support had small improvements in depression, antidepressant withdrawal symptoms and mental well-being.

However, only 4.9% of patients who were mailed invitations were eligible and consented to the trial. They had to be well enough to consider discontinuation, wish to do so and be at low risk of relapse. As I said in a previous post, people are generally very reluctant to take part in antidepressant discontinuation trials. There is at least a question about how much the results of the trial are generalisable to all those on antidepressants. Antidepressant discontinuation problems should not be minimised (see eg. last post). 

Nonetheless, if the paper leads to more review by general practitioners of those taking maintenance antidepressants this should be welcomed. Doctors are making far too many patients dependent on antidepressants and need to do more to prevent this happening (see eg. another previous post).

Mainstream psychiatry continues to minimise significance of antidepressant withdrawal

Mainstream psychiatry has minimised the significance of antidepressant withdrawal, as I first pointed out in a BMJ letter in 1997. My complaint then was that the Defeat Depression Campaign, launched in January 1992 by the Royal College of Psychiatrists in association with the Royal College of General Practitioners, advocated educating patients and doctors that discontinuing antidepressant treatment is not a problem. 

As I explained in my book chapter, what caused so much consternation to the Defeat Depression Campaign was that 78% of people in a door-to-door survey of public opinion thought that antidepressants are addictive. I suggested in the BMJ letter that the general public actually understood this issue better than the Royal Colleges of Psychiatrists and General Practitioners. It's common sense to believe that discontinuing taking medication that is thought to improve mood may be difficult. 

The British National Formulary (BNF), which doctors use for reference about medication, has given a warning since 1990 that symptoms may occur if an antidepressant is stopped suddenly after regular administration for 8 weeks or more. In fact, case reports of discontinuation reactions have appeared since antidepressants were first introduced. The Drugs and Therapeutic Bulletin (DTB), which publishes independent, practical, patient-orientated, evidence-based content on medicines for healthcare professionals, recommended in 1999 that if maintenance antidepressant treatment is discontinued that both the doctor and patient need to be alert to the risk of discontinuation effects and the re-emergence of depressive symptoms, which can occur on cessation of any antidepressant. It made clear that antidepressants should not be stopped abruptly, nor treatment courses interrupted, unless there is a good clinical reason, for example a serious adverse effect or patient request.

A new class of antidepressants called serotonin specific reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) was introduced onto the UK market in 1987. Withdrawal symptoms were only acknowledged by the drug companies after SSRIs had been in widespread clinical use for several years. A consensus meeting of experts, sponsored by Eli Lilly, the manufacturers of fluoxetine, or Prozac™, as it is known by its trade name, was held in Phoenix, Arizona, at the end of 1996. This led to an editorial in the British Medical Journal in 1998 acknowledging that antidepressant  discontinuation problems existed (Haddad et al, 1998). It suggested, though, that they were both preventable and simple to treat. The same authors only two years later acknowledged that discontinuation symptoms are common (Young & Haddad, 2000). 

The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, which evaluates treatments for NHS use, therefore, stated in its 2004 depression guideline the opposite of what was recommended by the Defeat Depression campaign: ie. that all patients prescribed antidepressants should be informed that discontinuation/withdrawal symptoms may occur on stopping, missing doses or, occasionally, on reducing the dose of the drug. It qualified this, though, by saying that symptoms are usually mild and self-limiting but can occasionally be severe, particularly if the drug is stopped abruptly. 

More recently in its 2022 guidance on ‘Medicines associated with dependence or withdrawal symptoms: Safe prescribing and withdrawal management for adults’, NICE clearly states that antidepressants cause withdrawal symptoms even though they have not historically been classified as dependence-forming medicines. In its updated 2022 depression guideline, it now says that withdrawal symptoms can be mild and usually go away within 1 to 2 weeks; can sometimes be more difficult, with symptoms lasting longer (in some cases several weeks, and occasionally several months); and can sometimes be severe, particularly if the antidepressant medication is stopped suddenly. At least the guideline now acknowledges that withdrawal symptoms are not as usually mild and self-limiting as the previous version of the guideline stated. 

This amendment was made after a complaint was made to the Royal College of Psychiatrists, which I signed (see eg. previous post). Although the complaint was initially wrongly dismissed, the College did eventually accept there should be greater recognition of the potential in some people for severe and long-lasting withdrawal symptoms on and after stopping antidepressants and called for NICE to update its guideline on antidepressant withdrawal (see eg. another previous post). 

I still worry, though, that the full importance of antidepressant withdrawal has, after all these years, not been understood by mainstream psychiatry (see previous post). There is in fact limited scientific evidence on this topic and recommendations are too driven by personal opinions or experiences rather than evidence as such (see another previous post). There are also methodological problems with antidepressant discontinuation studies, not least that blinding strategies are often insufficient to properly address placebo and nocebo aspects. What is commonly overlooked is that antidepressant withdrawal symptoms even occur in blinded antidepressant arms when antidepressants are continued. 

This finding has been confirmed in a new systematic review based on short-term industry studies (see Psychology Today article). One in three people were found to have at least one withdrawal symptom in the antidepressant withdrawal arm, but one in six people were still found to have withdrawal symptoms in the control arm even though antidepressants were continued. 

The problem with the new systematic review is that it minimises the frequency of antidepressant withdrawal, suggesting they occur in only 15% of people. But withdrawal symptoms may occur during and despite slow tapering and may persist for a long time (see eg. previous post). Even with the help of CBT to prevent relapse after withdrawal, only 36% of patients succeeded in discontinuing antidepressants over 16 months in a failed trial that found no difference between CBT and controls. Only 28% did not have a recurrence. 

Patients are actually, generally, very reluctant to take part in antidepressant discontinuation trials (see previous post). Fear of recurrence, relapse, or disturbing current mental equilibrium is common and prior failed attempts to discontinue antidepressants reinforce these expectations. People have also commonly been taken in by the myth of chemical imbalance in the brain as the cause of depression (see eg. another previous post) and are, therefore understandably, fearful and uncertain about stopping antidepressants, as the thought is their chemical imbalance could return. This fear overpowers the concern and uncertainty about continuing antidepressants. It's understandable if people think it’s better to be safe than sorry by continuing antidepressants (see eg. yet another previous post). 

So, even though we may have gone from the situation of antidepressant withdrawal symptoms being denied, as in the Defeat Depression campaign, to one in which they are accepted but the significance minimised (see eg. previous post), there is still insufficient understanding of the nature of antidepressant withdrawal. The situation has not really changed from what I wrote in an Openmind article nearly 25 years ago:-

People may form attachments to their medications more because of what they mean to them than what they do. Psychiatric patients often stay on medications, maybe several at once, even though their actual benefit is questionable. Any change threatens an equilibrium related to a complex set of meanings that their medications have acquired. These issues of dependence should not be minimised, yet commonly treatment is reinforced by emphasising that antidepressants, for example, are not addictive.

Even though psychiatrists may want to justify antidepressant treatment, this does not excuse minimising problems caused by taking it. Doctors are advocates of antidepressant treatment and this has led to them overlooking what should have been obvious about the risk of discontinuation problems. Perhaps we shouldn't be too surprised that doctors have been slow to recognise antidepressant discontinuation reactions and continue to minimise their significance, as they focus on short-term fixes of emotional problems (see eg. previous post), they are not properly psychologically minded and they are too quick to peddle medication and oversimplistic psychological interventions (see eg. another previous post). I’m not saying this to polarise debate about modern psychiatry, but the biomedical model that mental illness is due to brain disease has became too dominant and should not be buttressed by denying or minimising the significance of antidepressant withdrawal and other medication side effects.

To keep you in good humour

History of Psychiatry has an interesting article on ‘Cheerfulness in the history of psychiatry’. As the article says, “the notion of the French gaité tends to couple mood with an innate configuration, both procuring laughter, fun and vivacity". It goes on to mention Louis-Antoine Marquis de Caraccioli who was “ a prolific writer of the eighteenth century, [who] dedicated a book to a psychological theme that medicine has forgotten: ‘gaité’ in French". 

The article goes on:-

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, this work inspired two doctoral theses in medicine, … In their texts, Louis Monferran (1785– ?) and Vincent Rémi Giganon (1794–1857) explored the therapeutic benefits of the medical prescription of cheerfulness. In addition to lifestyle recommendations, they focused on the psychotropic substances available to them: alcohol, coca, hemp and opiates. … Giganon [also] … recommended … inhaled nitrous oxide gas.

Well, at least they included lifestyle recommendations as well as various substances. We have learnt a lot about these substances since Montferran and Giganon and can also learn from these authors’ historical theses for the present. Of course psychedelic substances are making a comeback as prescribed medications (see previous post). But, although fighting sadness with cheerfulness may seem to make sense. we also need to be realistic. 

It may be easy to get caught up in the charms of momentary cheerfulness. To quote Giganon from the article. "Laughter, song, wordplay, and jargon may spell doubts and allay suspicions". Or, to quote Monferran, again from the article, "Momentary cheerfulness delights the soul without perturbing it, evokes laughter without ridicule, and refines pleasures without corrupting them”. By contrast, "lasting or internal cheerfulness is based on an inner contentment, a blameless conscience, and the secret applause that follows a good action; this joy is more perfect than momentary cheerfulness". Modern society has become too focused on quick fixes (see previous post) and oversimplistic psychiatric treatment (see another previous post).

Shifting mental health policy

I've mentioned the Beyond Pills All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) in a previous post. It has recently launched a report entitled Shifting the Balance Towards Social Interventions: A Call for an Overhaul of the Mental Health System. There is a YouTube video available of the excellent launch event of the report, which included presentations by Dainius Pūras (see eg. previous post) and Michelle Funk (see eg. another previous post). 

Mental health practice does need to be rethought (see previous post). Understanding about mental health problems needs to be improved, including what children are told about mental illness (see eg. previous post). The Mental Health Act also needs to be reformed (see another previous post). Rights and recovery-orientated services need to be at the centre, not the margins of mental health services, as currently.

Mental health services need to be realigned with better strategic direction to make them more functional and integrated. For example, there needs to be a mental health hub and community mental health team (CMHT) in each Primary Care Network (PCN). CMHTs have become too large and need to be devolved more locally, alongside non-medical services in the hubs.

Asperger’s autism

Kevin Rebecchi has provided a first English translation and introduction to Hans Asperger’s 1982 chapter ‘Early childhood autism, Asperger type’ published after his death in 1980 (see History of Psychiatry article). Asperger distinguishes his use of the term ‘autistic’ from that of Eugene Bleuler, who gave the name to the apparent impenetrable wall that separated schizophrenic from other people. Leo Kanner separately described what Asperger thought was a rare form of early infantile autism. Asperger differed by seeing people generally as having the ability to behave in an ‘autistic’ manner.

Asperger children were noticeable at school where they were very difficult to discipline and often failed because of their so-called different psyche, being intelligent, highly reflective and observant, seemingly devoid of feelings and yet able to have subtle emotions. Most importantly, it was the visibly limited and self-centred, very idiosyncratic way of dealing with people that was labelled ‘autistic’.

As Rebecchi points out, Lorna Wing introduced the concept of the autistic triad of difficulties in social interaction, communication and imagination and coined the term Asperger’s Syndrome. The study Wing based the autistic triad on was mainly of intellectually disabled children. She disagreed with Asperger and said these children lacked common sense, were not creative but merely logical, did not have high intelligence (several with IQ < 70) and would only repeat things by rote. Asperger’s autism in fact was not really characterised by the autistic triad at all.

Asperger thought the term ‘psychopathy’ applied to the children he described and they were seen as difficult both at home and school. He thought, nonetheless, they should be respected for who they are, and that it was quite wrong to see difficult people who are out of the ordinary as of inferior social value. As far as Asperger was concerned, some autistic people bring much to the world and are “the salt of the earth”. 

As I have said before (see eg. previous post), there is a need for a rethink about autism. It is now seen as part of the umbrella term ‘neurodiversity’ (see another previous post). Its meaning may well have become too vague and restoring understanding, I think, will benefit by looking again at its historical origins, as does Rebecchi.

The origins of the charity Mind

I’m now into my second year of being a Trustee at Norfolk and Waveney Mind. Not many people know about the roots of Mind in the UK, but they go back to Clifford Beers’ book (1908) A mind that found itself. There’s a very good, inclusive biography of Beers available (Dain, 1980). He died as a patient in a psychiatric hospital in 1943.

William James sent a letter to Beers encouraging him to publish his book manuscript. Beers had described his mistreatment by staff in psychiatric hospitals, not dissimilar to the scandals of recent times (see eg. previous post). He wanted to campaign for psychiatric reform and set up the Connecticut Society for Mental Hygiene. Mental hygiene was a movement to prevent insanity by providing information to the public. The term ‘mental hygiene’ was suggested to Beers by Adolf Meyer, Professor of Psychiatry at Johns Hopkins University and commonly seen as the Dean of American psychiatry in the first half of the twentieth century (see eg. my 2007 article). These days we tend to use the term ‘mental health’ in much the same way as ‘mental hygiene’, meaning the conditions and practices that help to maintain mental health. Meyer also sponsored A mind that found itself with William James. There was tension between Meyer and Beers and establishment psychiatrists were very much part of the mental hygiene movement, although Beers wanted more of an advocacy organisation for the insane, more like the modern survivor/user movement in psychiatry since the 1960/70s.

Beers went on to become the secretary in the USA of the National Committee for Mental Hygiene, a voluntary agency for which he raised millions of dollars. The International Committee for Mental Hygiene was formed in 1919 and its name was changed in 1947 to the World Federation for Mental Health, an organisation that still exists today (see its website).

There had been no British equivalent of the lay critique of psychiatry by Beers. However, the link between mental hygiene and the social psychiatry of the Second World War and postwar reconstruction (see my 2015 talk) was already apparent in a 1935 letter for peace drafted by the Netherlands Medical Association and signed by 339 leading psychiatrists round the world. The psychological ideas related to mental hygiene came together in the formation of the World Federation for Mental Health (WFMH) in 1948 at an International Congress in London, of which J. R. Rees (see Wikipedia page), who had been Consulting Psychiatrist to the British Army and co-founder of the Tavistock Clinic (see Wikipedia page), was President. As the original deputy director and then medical director, Rees built the Tavistock into Britain’s most important centre for the study of holistic medicine (see his obituary). He resigned from the Tavistock in 1947 and thereafter was Director of WFMH from 1948-61.

Toms (2010) describes the formation in 1946 of the National Association for Mental Health (NAMH), which became Mind, in the context of the mental hygiene movement. It was formed from three organisations: the National Council for Mental Hygiene (NCMH), the Central Association for Mental Welfare (CAMW) and the Child Guidance Council (CGC)

NCMH had been formed in 1922 by members of the Medico-Psychological Association (see BMJ article). Mental hygiene had also been promoted by the overlapping membership in the origins of the Tavistock clinic in 1920 as the way to prevent mental health problems. The tension about how much mental hygiene was really about lunacy reform, rather than just the prevention of mental illness, mentioned above in the conflict between Beers and Meyer, is also reflected in a 1924 BMJ letter from Lionel Weatherley. 

CAMW was established in 1913, the same year as the Mental Deficiency Act to ascertain the mentally defective population in England and Wales. The Act also founded a Board of Control to oversee the whole mental health system and the Board assisted in the creation of CAMW. Mental deficiency was associated with social inefficiency and social problems. 

CGC was founded in 1926. Both NCMH and CAMW thought child guidance clinics to be central to providing comprehensive mental hygiene for the community to prevent more serious problems later in life. 

Adoption of the brand name Mind signalled the shift to a campaigning organisation for patient rights in 1972. National Mind has listed its main achievements since its formation (see webpage). Local Minds, which are unique and independent charities, deliver services for people with mental health problems and run charity shops which meet the Mind Quality Mark and are part of the Mind Federation. A priority for National Mind in its current restructure is the policy of Federation First.

Biopsychosocial diversity

How about changing the term ‘neurodiversity’ to ‘biopsychosocial diversity’? As I said in a previous post, neurodiversity is an umbrella term. It actually means different things to different people. Fundamentally, it is about recognising personal differences and the need for society to adapt to those differences.

There are also disadvantages with the term ‘neurodiversity’ (see eg. previous post). It tends to imply that people’s brains are different. Of course people’s brains are not the same. They are different people. But that doesn’t necessarily mean that their differences are just due to their brains. Don’t get me wrong! Of course the brain constructs people. But so do their development and experiences, maybe particularly in the family situation but also outside.

It’s wrong to think that people are their brains (see eg. previous post). All sorts of myths are being promulgated about who we are. People need to  be understood as wholes, as their brains are only part of them. Whelpley et al (2023) note the distinction between the social and medical models of neurodiversity and the need for a more person-centred approach to neurodiversity. Maybe switching the term ‘neurodiversity’ to ‘biopsychosocial diversity’ would help to create this more personal focus.

Rethinking mental health practice

As I said, for example in my 2002 article, there is an overemphasis on psychiatric diagnosis. Nonetheless, the current diagnostic system still needs to be referenced when discussing mental health system reform, if only to avoid confusion. Over the longer term language can change. Certainly it has done so in the past, for example reflected in repeated revision of the DSM manual (see eg. previous post). 

As I have also said, the UK mental health system has become too dysfunctional and fragmented (see eg. previous post and another previous post). The problem is not just insufficient funding. Throwing more money at the problem is not going to solve it and hasn’t worked anyway. For example, waiting lists for assessment for neurodiversity are out of control (see eg. previous post). An excellent report from the N8 Research partnership (2024) on autism in children and young people makes 3 recommendations (see last post). These can be summarised more generally as (1) More integrated working within mental health services and between different services, not just health services. (2) Improve training co-produced with people with lived experience to provide and deliver holistic support which is not overmedicalised and focuses on people’s needs rather than being diagnosis-led. (3) Integrated care including both statutory and non-statutory services at local levels should be overseen by a prioritised governmental approach to addressing the crisis. 

The UK is not in the position to be able to put a large amount of money into health services and public services generally. The next UK government needs to act at pace though. Failure to provide appropriate mental health support results in poor long term outcome and high rates of associated health conditions. A major barrier in our existing systems is the perceived need for a medical diagnosis of mental health problems before people can receive support. Overmedicalisation of mental health problems also means the health system simply cannot meet the demand for all such assessments (see eg. previous post). Giving support on the basis of mental health need is required nonetheless, even if people don’t have a mental health diagnosis. Services need to be developed on the basis of this principle, co-ordinated by NHS England and implemented locally. Such a plan should be prioritised by the next government.

Rethinking neurodiversity

I very much like the definition of neurodiversity used at the spotlight conference in Bradford last year:-

Neurodiversity is the term used to describe the wide variety [of] different ways human beings think, learn, communicate and exist in the world. It is an umbrella term - a word that sums up lots of different things and helps us reframe conditions such as autism, ADHD, dyslexia as differences rather than deficits.

As I mentioned in my last post, a recent report on autism in children and young people, one of the main components of said neurodiversity (see previous post), by the N8 Research Partnership talks about the need for a radical rethink on autism. It was the result of a collaborative programme of work between Child of the North and the Centre for Young Lives. Three helpful evidenced-based recommendations are made:-

(1) Build effective partnerships between education and health professionals for assessing and supporting autistic children. This should include delivering assessments in education settings and making a holistic offer of support in schools and nurseries before and after a formal diagnosis is made. 

(2) Provide and extend access to mandatory Continuing Professional Development (CPD) courses for health, education, and social care professionals that improve understanding and awareness of autism (and related issues). These courses should include information on how to create “neurodiverse friendly” environments, and particularly raise awareness of autism in girls and ethnic minority groups. Additional training should be co-produced by individuals with lived experience, delivered to professionals, and integrated into undergraduate health and education professional training, to improve the identification of autistic girls.  

(3) Create formal partnerships at a local authority level comprising sector leaders (including schools, health, voluntary services, faith, universities, educational psychologists, and businesses) to oversee a prioritised governmental ward-level approach to addressing the autism crisis. The partnership should focus on its most disadvantaged wards and provide leadership in trialling data-driven, community and family co-produced, “whole system” approaches to improve autism support with and through education settings.

As the report says, these recommendations have resource implications but offer the potential for decreasing long-term costs by acting now. They should actually benefit the economy by increasing the employment of autistic people. Throwing money at the problem doesn’t solve it. To quote from the report:-

The time has come for everyone to cross organisational and geographical boundaries and commit to working together in the best interests of autistic CYP [children and young people] and their families.

A major barrier to progress is the overemphasis on psychiatric diagnosis (see eg. my article). This relates to the overmedicalisation of developmental and mental health problems (see eg. previous post). I very much agree with the essence of the report that support should be given on the basis of need regardless of the diagnosis of autism.

The industrialisation of neurodiversity

Nuffield Health has highlighted the need for a radical rethink on neurodiversity services (see eg. Sky news report) by its publication of data on waiting lists for assessment for ADHD and autism (see blog post). Increased public awareness of autism, ADHD and other neurodivergent conditions has led to more people seeking support and, as a Guardian report says, the “NHS faces [an] ‘avalanche’ of demand for autism and ADHD”. What’s required is a needs-based rather than diagnosis-led service, as has been argued for autism in children by a report resulting from a collaborative programme of work between Child of the North and the Centre for Young Lives. 

Neurodiversity has become an industry, often more motivated by profit than patient interest. Biomedical myths that suggest emotional problems are due to brain disorder support this development, although the neurodiversity movement itself promotes neurodiversity as not being a mental health problem. Neurodiversity in this sense means intrinsic diversity of brain function (see previous post). Society does need to adapt to individual differences but to suggest these personal differences are due to brain problems is also a biomedical myth.

The internet does seem to have made it relatively easy to sell all sorts of mental health treatments online, including psychological, medication and other physical treatments (see eg. previous post). People talk about COVID causing an increase in demand for mental health treatments, but maybe that’s just because the pandemic was associated with more widespread use of the internet. In another previous post, I expressed scepticism that COVID really increased depression and anxiety, not to minimise the emotional impact of the pandemic, and of course long COVID. Certainly, as I said in my last post, the marketing of digital apps online is out of control.  And it’s particularly the diagnosis-led basis of such interventions than can lead to their exploitation, even to corrupt business practices (see eg. yet another previous post). 

As I keep saying, the cultural process of seeking to create panaceas for emotional and other mental health problems doesn’t always work and may create more problems than it is worth (see previous post). The limitation of treatment to help people cope with their differences from others does need to be recognised, but such people should be able to obtain support if they ask for it. They don’t necessarily require a label of neurodiversity or any other mental health diagnosis to be able to make the most of that support.

Digital apps in mental health

Charlotte Blease (2023) points out that the digital health economy is out of control. There are tens of thousands of apps for people to download. The motivation for these apps may not necessarily be to improve patient care but to make profit (see eg. previous post). 

What's needed is better evidence that these apps are of any benefit to people. Placebo effects need to be controlled in research studies. As Charlotte says, many studies lack a clear description of the nature of the control. Robust placebo design is required in randomised controlled studies. As with psychotherapy trials there will always be a question in assessing the efficacy of mental health apps about the adequacy of control groups (see my BMJ letter). There is enough questioning even of the effectiveness of psychotropic medication (see eg. another previous post) and psychotherapy (see eg. yet another previous post) to reinforce the need to ensure that these apps are not really exploiting people. 

There is concern, of course, in general about misinformation on the internet (see eg. previous post). But medication and other physical treatments for mental health problems and psychological therapy are being oversold on the internet (see eg. another previous post). How are we supposed to decide which is the best app to use? Does it matter? Are they just panaceas (see yet another previous post)? I'm not saying using a digital app may not help. But we do need to recognise their limitations and potential costs and side effects.

Mental Health Act reform by a failed government

The Government has responded to the Joint Committee on the draft Mental Health Bill (see previous post). Tim Spencer-Lane has summarised in a Linkedin post which recommendations from the Scrutiny Committee were rejected and which were accepted by the government. As I said in a tweet, the response is disappointing but not surprising. As I keep saying, current reforms of the Mental Health Act (MHA) do not go far enough (see previous post). I also think that the opportunity should be taken to reform the Mental Health Tribunal (see another previous post) and formalise the role of a triage AMHP (see yet another previous post).

Failure to follow the recommendation about abolishing community treatment orders (CTOs) for civil patients is the most serious issue. What was fudged by the original review led by Simon Wessely was that mental health legislation is about supporting people with mental health problems (see previous post). Instead the government continues to parrot that review by saying that the MHA "governs the compulsory detention and medical treatment of people with severe mental illness, people with a learning disability and autistic people". It does but it also does, or should do, far more than that. 

Increasing coercion, such as CTOs, is not always the best way to manage risk in mental health services. The over-preoccupation with risk, that led to the introduction of CTOs, has not always produced sensible risk management (see previous post). Even more fundamentally, rights and recovery-orientated services need to be at the centre not the margins of mental health services (see another previous post), whereas the government merely says it will keep a rights-based approach under review (see response to recommendation 2 from the Scrutiny Committee). The government does not seem to be taking seriously that system and service changes are required to reduce coercion in mental health services as recommended by both the World Health Organisation and World Psychiatric Association (see yet another previous post). 

The Scrutiny Committee's recommendation for the creation of a Mental Health Commissioner, rejected by the government, was also helpful. As I said in a previous post, taking over the function of the Mental Health Act Commission (MHAC) by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) has meant, in my view, that a "specific emphasis on the rights of detained patients has been lost, as CQC has the more general role of regulating health and social care". More independence from CQC and NHS England is required to protect the rights of mentally ill people, as reflected in recent scandals exposed by TV programmes like Panorama (see eg. another previous post). The criteria in mental health legislation that allow coercive treatment are too wide to prevent abuse (see yet another previous post) and this must be remedied.

Not sure if the publication of this government response to the scrutiny committee will be taken forward in this parliament, such as having parliamentary time to discuss it. I think any Labour government will have to ask DHSC to go back to first principles, although there are many proposals, both within current draft legislation and elsewhere, including on this blog, which can be taken forward on this basis (see previous post). 

Habituation to antidepressants

Discussion on the Critical Psychiatry Network email list has firmed up my views about antidepressant withdrawal. As I point out on my Antidepressant Discontinuation Reactions webpage, there is confusion about the technical meanings of terms like drug dependence and drug addiction. Dependence and addiction in common parlance, though, tend to mean difficulty in managing without the drug. This is a psychological problem, and can also have a physical cause.

As I also say in a previous post, The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) clearly states that antidepressants cause withdrawal symptoms even though they have not historically been classified as dependence-forming medicines. It sees dependence as characterised by tolerance and withdrawal symptoms. Addiction is said to include the additional characteristics of cravings, lack of control, overuse and continued use despite harm, associated with problematic behaviours.

People can become habituated to antidepressants. As I wrote in my OpenMind article :-

People may form attachments to their medications more because of what they mean to them than what they do. Psychiatric patients often stay on medications, maybe several at once, even though their actual benefit is questionable. Any change threatens an equilibrium related to a complex set of meanings that their medications have acquired.

Taking antidepressants can be an identity-altering experience (see previous post). No wonder people can have difficulties discontinuing them. People can be frightened about stopping antidepressants (see another previous post and yet another previous post).

Probably the first systematic review of antidepressant withdrawal was by Fava et al (2015) (see previous post). Personally, like Fava et al, I’ve always emphasised the vulnerability to relapse created by taking antidepressants (see another previous post). I’ve encouraged a focus on psychological aspects of prescribed drug dependence (see eg. my book chapter). Critical psychiatrists who believe in deprescribing often think the evidence for physical dependence is incontrovertible. But I do not agree.

There is little evidence that antidepressants cause increased tolerance, for example, in the same way as alcohol and opiates. Antidepressants are not primarily reinforcing like psychostimulants (see eg. previous post). I, therefore, think it is a mistake to say that antidepressants cause physical dependence. That’s not to diminish the power of psychological dependence, which they do cause.

Functional somatic symptoms caused by antidepressant withdrawal are of course common in medicine. It’s the nature of such symptoms that people find it difficult to appreciate they may not have a physical cause. Hence people who have experienced antidepressant withdrawal often disagree with me, sometimes vehemently. Nonetheless, the commonsense view is that people can become dependent on antidepressants for psychological reasons. This was a finding from the Defeat Depression campaign when it tried to educate the public that antidepressants are not addictive, when commonsense understanding is that they must be in the common parlance definition of addiction, as above, as the public already knew (see my BMJ letter).

As I note on my Antidepressant Discontinuation Reactions webpage, the strongest evidence in favour of physical dependence is neonatal withdrawal reactions. I note there, though, that data from spontaneous reporting is difficult to interpret. I haven’t updated that webpage for some time, but even so, neonatal reactions could be due to serotonin syndrome rather than withdrawal. It worries me about the dose of antidepressants that is getting through to neonates in utero. As far as I can see, the more recent studies of poor neonatal adaptation after antidepressant exposure in third trimester have not been able to distinguish that the cause is withdrawal rather than serotoninergic toxicity.

I’m old enough to remember the debate about whether withdrawal symptoms in benzodiazepines were merely due to habituation or physical dependence, led by someone like Malcolm Lader, who in the end came down on side of physical dependence, but he would never have denied psychological dependence. It is true that what led to the decline in the benzodiazepine market was the claim that benzodiazepines cause physical dependence, which I agree there is evidence for because of convulsions on withdrawal. Still, even with most physically dependence forming substance there is also psychological dependence and this must not be denied.

The problem with benzodiazepines is why the antidepressant market was so worried about also being labelled as causing physical dependence and went for admitting antidepressant discontinuation problems. Paxil/Seroxat makers, seen as being the worse for causing discontinuation, but I think probably unfairly because the fluoxetine people wanted to turn the focus away from themselves by pointing out the longer half-life, also had to admit that it caused addiction because of the common parlance use of the word (see Guardian article). The old common sense distinction between physical and psychological dependence got fudged by the syndromal approach of Edwards et al, even though there was strength in the syndromal approach with its seven elements (see Edwards & Gross (1976)).

Does anyone these days even know what I’m talking about when I say the syndromal approach to alcoholism and drug dependence? As I keep saying, psychological factors in antidepressant withdrawal cannot be denied. I’m just encouraging a sceptical attitude about physical withdrawal.